That's precisely my point, you're making an argument to move health care away from market incentives on the basis that corporations are profit maximizing and rational and would respond to market incentives. Given a free market, we would never see costs this high. It is the absence of a free market that has allowed such a ballooning in costs. So why would the solution to this problem be to further remove ourselves from the market incentives that would solve things?
Read back to the post I was responding to. We are talking past one another. Under the ACA mandate, people buy insurance from private insurers. Those insurers have a market incentive to pay as little for services as they can, just like you do. They want to make a profit; if they pay too much fro services they won't make a profit. They have market clout and can get better deals from providers than you can individually. The non-market condition exists when people without insurance get care they can't pay for.
Just because you have historical precedence doesn't mean this is an efficient allocation of resources. Are you arguing that there isn't a primary care shortage?
Many studies indicate there is a shortage of primary care physicians. ACA takes steps to increase the supply of primary care physicians.
This isn't the kind of trend that shows up in two years. It is the kind of trend that shows up in 30.
I agree stuff like this takes a while to show up. But in my post I was responding to a claim that medicine was becoming less attractive as a career. If you are correct that these trends take decades to reveal themselves, then, just as there is no basis for saying medicine is not becoming less attractive (your point), there is also no basis for saying that medicine is becoming less attractive (sort of my point). It is all assumption and bias with little data. There will be all sorts of mini-trends over the next 30 years, as when med school apps went up in the mid 90s, down in the early 00s and then back up. We are two very short inconclusive years into it, but things are holding up for now.
It is relevant because quoting an increase in applicant numbers means nothing when you consider the increase in college grads. Considering the percentage of college grads is a more appropriate way to gauge student interest in medicine. If the percentage of college grads interested in medicine drops then we have reason to be concerned about our ability to care for an aging population..."applicant numbers have increased" mean nothing unless we correct for increases in population.
I didn't quote just an increase in number of applicants, I also quoted an increase in MCAT scores and an increase in match applicants, which may have something to do with FMGs wanting to practice in the US (I didn't track the numbers of FMGs over time). MCAT have gone up, indicating applicant quality is still high.
I was looking at the issue from the point of view of whether there were large numbers of students of high caliber (high MCAT) who wanted to go to med school. There are. You are looking at it from the point of view of whether a large percentage of students find med school attractive, with a dropping percentage indicating that medicine is becoming less sought after. I see your point, but if you can still fill a class with people who have skill (MCAT),does it really matter if more people choose Wall Street than medicine?
Moreover, I am not convinced that med school apps have dropped as a percentage of college grads. The data is out there, but I haven't found it. Though, as you say, short-term data may not mean much, and we don't have long term data yet, so even looking at recent changes in percentages really does not reveal much.
This has been interesting, but I have other stuff to do. There are a lot of little ideas swirling around in this discussion, but my basic point was this. When markets work, they can allocate resources efficiently. The pre-ACA individual health insurance market is not a well-functioning market. Conservatives seem to think that if you eliminate the tax advantages for employer provided insurance and require that insureds keep skin in the game, the inefficient individual markets will become efficient.
I disagree. If you do those two things, and only those two things, you will throw literally millions of individuals with high risk/pre-exisiting conditions into a market that does not like to provide insurance to people with high risk/pre-existing conditions or, importantly, for people who the insurers think might have high risk/pre-exsiting conditions. Insurers know less about insureds' health than do the insureds, so insurers reasonably believe that the people who want insurance are the people who need insurance, so they have to charge more to cover that risk. The economist Kenneth Arrow won his Nobel for illuminating how asymmetric information and similar market failures are an unavoidable aspect of the insurance market; even one without government subsidies for employer-provided health insurance or by low deductibles. So, if you just throw the high risk to the necessarily inefficient individual insurance market, they will suffer.
And you can't avoid this by having the insureds keep skin in the game. High deductible policies are fine, but people will need insurance to cover big risks, and it is the big expensive problems that eat up most of the health care dollars. If it makes you feel better, have everyone pay for their own routine treatments, but don't expect to cut a lot off the health care bill. The people with extensive cancer treatments, long-term expensive illnesses and such will still eat up your dollars.
If you want an individual insurance market that actually functions, you have to take steps to create it. Because of the market failures Arrow articulated, an efficient market will not spontaneously generate. I guess that may be our biggest difference in viewpoint. You would want to eliminate the insurers' incentive to discriminate based on health status, such as pre-existing conditions, since that moots some of the information asymmetry problem, as well as a lot of transaction costs. If insurers can't discriminate on this basis, they have to compete on price and service, not underwriting ability, which is now a huge part of their game in the individual market. You also make it easier for insureds to shop around since they don't have to get physicals or wait for ratings results. And of course, people with pre-existing conditions can get insurance, which will help alleviate their suffering. But if you do this, then policies may get more expensive since high risk folks will be the first in line for insurance. So, to get every one in the pool, including the young invulnerables, you need a mandate.
I know you won't accept that. But, all politics aside, if you are even considering dumping your employer provided policy for an individual (non-ACA) policy, I would strongly recommend that you learn about what rights you have in your state to renew your policy. You might end up with the insurer dumping you after you get sick, or maybe "just" increasing your premium by multiples. It is a very serious matter to lose your group coverage rights. Bottom line: I stand by my statement that you should do your utmost to avoid having to get coverage under a pre-ACA individual policies (as opposed to a group policy), and if ACA should get repealed, and the Reps don't put ACA-like protections in place in the individual market, you should avoid the individual market then as well.