AVOID MILITARY MEDICINE if possible

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recent article on how to fix milmed: complete link below:
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm1388.cfm

although I do not agree with the entire article, the below paragraph is 100% on the mark (except we need more than change, we need change for the better).

best quote from the article:

The military is served by many well-trained, skilled, and caring physicians, nurses, and other medical professionals. But more and more wounded service personnel are surviving horrific injuries. Ironically, that success further strains the system. While the overwhelming majority of military medical personnel are dedicated men and women, the problems with the military health care system are systemic. A large system that has a track record of inefficiency, high costs, and poor service is likely to be characterized by central control and a lack of choice for beneficiaries. Military medicine is simply another example of this phenomenon. Change is imperative.

:idea: :idea: :idea: :idea: :idea: :idea: :idea: :idea: :idea: :idea:

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recent question on how to "fix" milmed


the below is an exerpt from a memo I wrote and forwarded up the chain of command several years ago. How much changed for the better after the memo.....:idea: :sleep: :thumbdown:


A. REPRIORITIZE. I would submit that the following be a list of the TOP 5 priorities of our Family Practice Clinic, and in this order of importance:
1. Patient Care and Safety
2. Clinic Work Environment and Staff Morale
3. Education and Training
4. Patient Satisfaction
5. Administrative Goals and Metrics
I now also submit that without question, our clinics have been run backwards in terms of these goals. Administration emphasis has been entirely focused on meeting certain "Metric" numbers and hoping enough patients place compliment cards in feedback boxes. There is almost non-existent education and training as far as relating to medical care. Staff morale is terrible. If given the opportunity, many would resign immediately. Perhaps our best civilian nurse did just that this past week. Several months earlier another civilian nurse did the same and our best military nurse chose to separate rather than stay in this system despite having over 15 years of service. No-one has ever witnessed a new USAF family physician remain in the military beyond their initial obligation. Ideas to improve patient safety, provider training and education are quickly dismissed as soon as it is realized that clinic "numbers" might be adversely affected. Nearly 100% of all committee meetings are void of any provider input (attendance by providers goes against patient access to care).
The Surgeon General's office has listed their own priorities (access, HEDIS, PIMR), and it is these priorities that have driven our clinics (and driven the priorities of our local administration). In this environment, with 20-60% of clinic providers and staff gone on any given day, we have in-place a plan for failure. After years of attempting to make a failed PCO concept work, we have markedly degraded the quality of care given. Again, reprioritization on all levels is a key if we are to change this.

B. SITE VISITS. I do not know when or why "site visits" fell out of favor and were replaced with computerized metrics, but this must change. Why senior administration is willing to place more weight on inaccurate metrics, than on the word of their officer physicians is beyond me. One cannot shoehorn everything that goes into providing excellent health care into some conceptual pie chart framework. In addition, the metric numbers are frequently wrong. For example, the metrics on me personally show that I have 10-15 un-booked appointments everyday. The truth is I can count on one hand the number of un-booked appointments I have had, ever. Has anyone ever looked at the accuracy and validity of the numbers that steer the course of our clinics? While metrics have there usefulness, they should not become numeric substitutes for real objectives like excellent health care. Metrics are like vital signs on a patient. They are great to have, but if the patient is gasping and cyanotic, having an O2 sat of 100% should not be reassuring.

Site visits also are important to prevent the filtering out of important information as it makes its way to senior officials. Brig. General Barbara Brannon, our assistant Surgeon General, visited our base in the Fall of 2003. I will never forget her comment of how wherever she goes she hears "how wonderful the PCO Concept is working." I have spoken with USAF Family Physicians from coast to coast and never heard anything like that when describing the PCO concept. Currently there is no meaningful structure in which physicians can voice concerns.

C. LET COMMANDERS COMMAND. In a 6 week period - Fall of 2002, our clinic lost 3 of it's 5 Family Physicians (deployment, hardship, change of career field). Our Clinic Commander worked through TRICARE and arranged to have civilian providers available to provide care to the tremendous overflow of patients. Despite TRICARE approval of this, our senior leadership in Washington (MAJCOM) basically told our commander the following: "Either completely empanel those civilians just hired, or you will lose your military providers." Our commander also tried to open an urgent care center in an attempt to assist us, and again met with complete MAJCOM opposition. The system we now have, where leadership a thousand miles away denies the local leadership the tools necessary to provide safe and effective patient care must be changed.

D. APPROPRIATE PANEL SIZE. As stated earlier, inappropriate panel sizes are the foundation of our current problem. We should form a committee of civilian and military Family Physicians who can determine the correct empanelment for military physicians. Included would be contingency plans for deployments, military duties, physician extender supervision, and understaffed PCO teams. As a possible alternative to marked changes to panel size, have non-empanelled "float" providers and staff to fill-in for the 20-60% of personnel gone each day. At a minimum this should be 2 complete PCM teams.

E. DEVELOP A HEALTH CARE SYSTEM THAT ENCOURAGES PHYSICIANS TO STAY.
When physicians opt to leave the USAF after their initial obligation, much is lost. Physicians lose what may have once been a career goal (as in my case). The Air Force also loses, and perhaps more. By creating a health care system that is so blatantly "anti-physician", they lose out on all of the 2 - 4 years invested in providers during which they learned to function within an ever-more complicated medical system. A new provider must learn how to do MEBs, Profiles, and navigate CHCS and PGUI (computerized patient health record programs). There are multiple training schools and pre-deployment requirements. I have already discussed the fact that physicians are out of clinic 17-18 weeks per year (conservatively). Much of this time would be eliminated if physicians stayed in, not to mention the USAF would have a better, more seasoned provider.

It is not the raising of physician payment bonuses that will change the current retention predicament. Physicians will not continue to be part of the current healthcare system no matter what viable pay increases are seen.

It is not a change to the current high probability of deployment environment either that will help. When I raised my hand and became an USAF officer I knew that I could be required to sacrifice my life for my country. That I fully agreed to. What I did not agree to was to serve in a healthcare system that endangers those I swore to protect and serve in another oath I took years earlier; those of my patients.

It will be the creation of a clinic in which the physicians have the opportunity and some measure of control to provide good health care and develop into even better doctors. It will be the execution of a plan that gives the opportunity to be both "warrior" physician and family physician and do both with excellence. These opportunities do not exist in PCO.

Many of the problems facing military physicians are also found in the civilian work place. This makes now the perfect time to improve the USAF clinics and encourage physicians to stay. Unfortunately, the Air Force has taken the worst attributes of non-military healthcare, and made them their own (10).

F. TRIAGE PATIENTS to CIVILIAN PRACTICES. Those patients with the most severe, complex, and unstable health conditions should be transferred to civilian doctors. There they may get better continuity of care. Additionally, most physician extenders are not prepared to care for these patients and they are very likely to be the ones covering when Physicians are deployed/out of clinic. They are also the most at risk should labs and diagnoses be missed. For clinics like ours (without a hospital), this would also provide for better post-hospital care.

G. CAPTURE THE UNCOUNTED. The thousands of Reservist and Non-DMIS patients that we have been seeing day after day need to get enrolled and count in our panel size. This should not be a passive undertaking. Do not wait for them to come to us. Find out who they are and get it done.

H. CHAIN of COMMAND. How is it that in a Family Practice Clinic, there are virtually no Family Physicians in my entire chain of Command? In fact, there are probably few to none in the entire chain of command going all the way to the Surgeon General. I have the utmost respect for those officers that currently and in the past served as my superiors. Some of the most outstanding people I have ever known are in my chain of command. However, at the very least, they are placed at a huge disadvantage at attempting to effectively run a clinic that is not their specialty. I am hard pressed to name any profession where the supervisors have NEVER performed the job of those they supervise, yet that is how our clinic is run. In our clinic, we have inexperienced nurses with the rank of Captain who are in the leadership positions over doctors with higher ranks of Major and Lt. Colonel.

I. SAFEGUARD SYSTEMS. We should implement plans and procedures to prevent the types of mistakes noted in the "Malpractice and Near Misses" section above. This would at a minimum include a way to track abnormal labs and imaging results. Patients should be notified of all their lab results, not just the abnormal. In addition, patients new to a clinic would have 30 minute "initial evaluation" appointments to allow some time to completely review and update charts. Charts also need to be upgraded in terms of completeness and organization. While our current chart system may be adequate most active duty personnel, it is nearly non-functional for our retirees. Dictation systems, if used, must be held to high standards of timeliness. Supervision, education, and training (especially for new physician extenders) must become a reality.
__________________
ex-USAFdoc
 
another internet article consistent with what we have all been saying for years now.

Monday, March 05, 2007
Military MD Shortage at Home
Like the Washington Post says in today's story, "It is just not Walter Reed." There are deep, deep problems, throughout the military medical system. And it's going to take a long time to get to the bottom of them.

But here's a glaringly obvious one, to start: there just aren't enough military doctors to go around. So many MDs have been deployed to war zones that coverage back home -- for military family members, retirees, and garrisoned troops -- has been spread awfully thin.

I spoke to one Army doctor the other day - a chief of family practice at a good-sized facility. Let's call him Dr. Jonah. He oversees about a dozen doctors, each with at least 21 patients per day.

Which sounds like a lot - until you consider that he's got a patient base of over 18,000. Which means that diabetics or hypertensives -- who should be seen at least four times annually-- are only seen once a year. "There are women who haven't gotten pap smears in years, who go without mammograms for years," Dr. Jonah says. "The people that the government promised would take care of their health care are not getting nearly the coverage they need," he sighs.

The problem is that Dr. Jonah is the only military doctor at his facility; the rest are overseas. The administration has filled in, by hiring civilian docs -- but only on the cheap. These doctors are getting $50,000-$150,000 less than they would at a civilian hospital. "And you get what you pay for," Dr. Jonah says.

A military medical commission came to his facility not long ago, interviewed everyone in sight, and made some recommendations. Not much has changed, though. Well, except the facility is taking out new ads for doctors, in the local newspaper.

UPDATE: Time is arguing that the "wrong general" was fired. Instead of canning Walter Reed head honcho Maj. Gen. George Weightman, the Army should be kicking surgeon general Kevin Kiley to the curb. He's the former Walter Reed big who lived right by some of the worst facilities, and yet was dissing the Washington Post exposes, until recently. Oh, and by the way, Kiley covered up detainee abuse, too.
http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/03/like_the_washin.html
 
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It should be pretty straight forward to set panel sizes. For example you might need one FP per 1000 active duty personnel. Thus if you are at a base with 10,000 personnel you need 10 FP's. I think this is exactly what is needed across the board. Then you adjust salaries upward until the need is met.

Note: math error corrected
 
It should be pretty straight forward to set panel sizes. For example you might need one FP per 1000 active duty personnel. Thus if you are at a base with 10,000 personnel you need 5 FP's. I think this is exactly what is needed across the board. Then you adjust salaries upward until the need is met.

at my base, things were about as straight fwd as a tortuous sigmoidoscopy with a poor prep. Of course, it all started with "setting panel sizes". The USAF SG decided FPs could have larger panel sizes then before. So those were increased from about 700pt/doc to 1500 pts/doc. Then they were tweaked higher to 1600-1800 because we had more pts to care for. Then you replace doc billets with PAs (and they get there own 1500 pts), then you have reservist at your base that do not have a doc so that is added on. Then you deploy a few docs, close the IM dept and send those pts to FP, have some separate with no replacement for 4-6 months etc...........you get the idea. Pretty soon you are "covering" for 6000+ patients...............and all your commander says is that "on paper, we are fully manned." (yes that is an exact quote from one of my previous commanders).

you can have the best plan in the world on paper, but circumstances happen. And when you have complete centralized control, and those in control with different priorities than you the doc, you have a system designed to fail everybody.:thumbdown:
 
I can't understand that kind of management. By the science you know what the incidence of disease will be and you can easily calculate how many doctors are needed. I've seen the Army do this. They said x% of people coming back from deployment will develop this problem so we need to hire y # of doctors.
 
I can't understand that kind of management. By the science you know what the incidence of disease will be and you can easily calculate how many doctors are needed. I've seen the Army do this. They said x% of people coming back from deployment will develop this problem so we need to hire y # of doctors.

Because the management is not pt-oriented, nor is it md-oriented, it's administration-oriented.

They're making decisions based on their budget and their budget alone. They're making decisions based on useless metrics.

Our surgical department is in the green on the business plan every month so they won't increase our staff--there is not a single nurse in all of the surgical clinics. Why? Because we're in the green. When we explained that we're doing about 60-70% of what we could be doing with a full staff and thereby be even further in the green, they don't care.

When you have people who can put a check in their box making the decisions, and all that is needed is a check, you don't get quality. You get the bare minimum amount of ink needed to make that check.
 
It should be pretty straight forward to set panel sizes. For example you might need one FP per 1000 active duty personnel. Thus if you are at a base with 10,000 personnel you need 5 FP's. I think this is exactly what is needed across the board. Then you adjust salaries upward until the need is met.

Sounds like military math to me. If you have 10,000 patients, wouldn't you need 10 FP's?

Can someone explain to me the difference between an internist and a family physician in the military's eyes? I know that academics view them differently, but most patients see them both as primary care docs. Are there two separate clinics: IM and FP?
 
Sounds like military math to me. If you have 10,000 patients, wouldn't you need 10 FP's?

Can someone explain to me the difference between an internist and a family physician in the military's eyes? I know that academics view them differently, but most patients see them both as primary care docs. Are there two separate clinics: IM and FP?
In Milmed eyes there is no difference between the two.A panel of 1000 IM patients is vastly different from a panel of 1000 FP patients yet you are forced to run your clinic as if they were the same.:scared:
 
Sounds like military math to me. If you have 10,000 patients, wouldn't you need 10 FP's?

You are right. Thanks for pointing out my mistake. You get the picture though.
 
1000 patients is still a lot to cover. What does the typical civilian physician treat?

typical FP sees 24 pts/day, gets paid about 150K/yr, panel sizes about 1500 pts-2000 pts (more if you are strictly outpt/use hospitalist like me)

1000 is just a number. what you really need to know is the makeup of those 1000 pts, the number of diabetics, pts with heart disease, COPD, etc.

the other half of the story is what is the doc responsible for besides office care/visits.

As a civilian FP, I am currently taking care of about 3500+ patients, and working about as hard as I did taking care of patients in the USAF (talking FP pt care only here, not other milmed stuff). The major differences being in the USAF I had way more collateral duties, military meetings, mandatory PT, etc. Other things that matter alot are; are you a novice doc or seasoned? are these pts you are seeing for the first time or the 3rd+ time etc?

Taking care of 3500+ patients I am working about 50-60 hrs/week
In the USAF I was working about 60-80 hr/week

The other major difference is that the quality of my support staff is way more consistent/professional and it sure doesn't hurt to have the chart when I see the patient.

Put yet another way...here as a civdoc, I am the "pilot of the plane" and in the milmed system the doc is the "engine". (and many time we are the engine put at full tilt while admin has the brakes on, the wings missing, etc...and being blamed by admin that the plane just wont get airborne.)
 
Put yet another way...here as a civdoc, I am the "pilot of the plane" and in the milmed system the doc is the "engine". (and many time we are the engine put at full tilt while admin has the brakes on, the wings missing, etc...and being blamed by admin that the plane just wont get airborne.)

just another article showing how short the USAF is in providing the people to take care of our troops.

I especially agree with the last paragraph stating that it is especially the "day to day" chronic undermanning that is the hardest on staff.

http://www.airforceots.com/portal/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=143


War-zone deployments mean longer waits, more Tricare referrals at stateside hospitals

By Erik Holmes - Staff writer
Posted : January 29, 2007



Continuing personnel shortages and ramped up deployments have the Air Force medical corps stretched thin.

With no quick fix on the horizon, airmen and their families seeking medical care are finding longer waits for appointments at base medical centers and more referrals to civilian providers for routine care.

For medical personnel trying to keep up with a steady flow of patients, the crunch means longer hours and more stress.

Leaders at base hospitals and in the Air Force surgeon general’s office admit the medical system is strained, but they insist that good management and new recruiting programs in the works will allow them to meet their deployment obligations while continuing to provide airmen a high level of care.

“We’re stretched,” said Brig. Gen. (Dr.) David Young, commander of the 59th Medical Wing at Wilford Hall Medical Center in San Antonio. “This is a tough business we’re in. ... [But] our team has pulled together to constantly, daily rebalance what we do to meet our missions [of] being the Air Force’s flagship medical center, being constantly deploying ... and to provide health care.”

The medical staffing shortage is not new, but it has become more acute than in years past.

The most pressing shortage across the Air Force is in nursing. In fiscal 2006, 463 — or 12 percent — of the Air Force’s 3,855 authorized nursing positions were unfilled, according to the Air Force Surgeon General’s office.

As recently as 2003, the shortfall was 4 percent.

This shortage could have a direct effect on the quality of care patients receive, said Edward Brooks, a public health professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

“A shortage of nurses means fewer people on the front line, fewer people checking to make sure everything is running the way it ought to be,” he said. “The lack of nurses then translates into ... potentially poorer quality of care.”

The Air Force is trying to reduce the shortage by offering loan repayment and other benefits to nurses who join, but competition from the civilian side is fierce.

“There just aren’t enough of them nationwide to go around,” said Col. Joanne McPherson, commander of the 377th Medical Group at Kirtland Air Force Base, N.M. “You’re ... fighting for the same group of people that the other hospitals are fighting for.”

The National Center for Health Workforce Analysis estimates that the civilian sector is 8 percent short on nurses, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics projects that the nation will face a shortfall of more than 1 million nurses by the end of the decade.

The Air Force is at a competitive disadvantage in recruiting nurses because civilian hospitals can pay them significantly more than the military can, especially in the early years of their careers.

The medical service also faces a shortage of primary-care providers, such as family practice physicians, flight surgeons, physician’s assistants and nurse practitioners. The shortage in these areas is particularly severe at small bases, said Maj. Gen. (Dr.) Tom Loftus, operations director of the Air Force Medical Service.

But while most of those professions can be hired as civilian contractors, the shortage of flight surgeons — family doctors for aviators and their families — presents a unique problem.

The Air Force’s shortage of flight surgeons stands at more than 15 percent, according to the surgeon general’s office. And the service cannot draw on civilian contractors to fill this gap because few civilian physicians possess the skill and knowledge to care for aviators, Loftus said.

“Clearly, that’s not a specialty that you go out onto the street and contract for,” he said, “so we’re trying to take some of our family practice docs in the blue suits and get them trained so we can shift them into flight medicine, and then we can contract for [civilian] family physicians.”

Finally, there is a critical shortage of dentists. That shortage stood at 10 percent in fiscal 2006.

Further complicating matters for the Air Force Medical Service are deployment requirements for operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, which are going to increase by 20 percent beginning in the next couple of months.

On Jan. 15, the Air Force took over operational control and most of the staffing responsibility for the new combat support hospital at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan.

The number of medical personnel deployed at any time has remained consistent at about 1,000 for the past few years, but staffing the Bagram hospital will require about another 200.

“Clearly, it stretches us a little bit further, although we certainly feel like we can handle it,” Loftus said. “[We are] not stretched to the breaking point. ... Taking over Bagram supports the war effort, and that’s our No. 1 issue.”

Large medical facilities such as Wilford Hall have filled the bulk of the Air Force’s medical deployments, but the service will likely start drawing more heavily on smaller facilities as large facilities reach their limits.

Young, the commander at Wilford Hall, said his hospital cannot shoulder the added burden alone.

“We are going to be reaching out to fill [Bagram] through ... tapping into other places that haven’t been tapped yet,” he said. “We’ve taken the brunt of it so far, and ... it’ll be tough for me to go much further. Individuals, yes, but very large numbers — I don’t think I can go much further.”

Wilford Hall provides about 300 medical personnel at all times to the Air Force Theater Hospital at Balad Air Base, Iraq, and up to 200 additional staff may be deployed to other locations during a heavy deployment cycle, Young said. That amounts to 9 percent of the hospital’s staff of about 5,500.

Still, all the medical leaders who spoke to Air Force Times said the service will be able to continue the additional deployments for as long as necessary by shuffling personnel and hiring civilians to fill gaps.

Quality trumps quantity

But staffing shortages and deployments do affect medical care for airmen and their families back home.

Perhaps the most significant and visible effect is the longer wait time for those seeking routine appointments at base facilities.

Medical commanders and personnel at several bases reported longer wait times for patients. While they can keep up with the flow of critical cases and emergencies, airmen who have routine ailments or who want a checkup will find appointments harder to come by.

“I can get emergencies in, I can get urgents in,” Young said. “It’s the elective operation or the routine case that ... gets stretched out a bit. So where I’d like to get them in in seven days, maybe it’s nine or 10 days [for] the next appointment.”

McPherson said shortages at Kirtland — particularly of nurses — force her to choose between longer wait times for routine appointments and decreasing the quality of care.

“When you have a constant nursing shortage, the patient [wait] times go up quite a bit,” she said. “Our primary focus is making sure we maintain the quality. If we have to sacrifice the number of appointments that we have available in order to assure that there’s quality care, that’s a no-brainer. We’ll just do that.”

More beneficiaries are also finding that base facilities can’t see them fast enough, so Tricare is farming them out to civilian providers.

Military health care providers are required to see patients within 24 hours for acute care, seven days for routine appointments, 14 days for checkups and 30 days for specialty appointments.

If the base facility cannot meet these timelines, the patient can choose to wait longer to see a military provider or be referred to a civilian doctor through Tricare.

The Air Force surgeon general’s office was unable to provide statistics on Tricare referrals, but medical personnel at several bases said they are sending more patients to civilian providers.

At Wilford Hall, which sees more than 6,000 patients daily, about 9 percent of eligible patients are referred to civilian doctors through Tricare, Young said.

“I resist like crazy trying to send a patient downtown,” he said. “I sometimes just can’t meet the ... standard, and then it’s up to the patients. Do you want to wait, or do you want to go downtown?”

Joyce Raezer, director of government relations for the National Military Family Association, said some families seeking care are simply being turned away and sent to civilian doctors because base facilities are overwhelmed.

“What we hear from families is that, in a lot of cases, families aren’t offered the choice of going out,” she said. “They’re just basically being told, ‘Suck it up [because] we just can’t get you in right now.’ “

The situation is particularly bad for retirees, who are the lowest priority when it comes to scheduling appointments.

Active-duty airmen are the highest priority, followed by families enrolled in Tricare Prime and then retirees enrolled in Tricare Prime.

“There is a sense among the retirees, especially the over-65 retirees, that they are getting squeezed out,” Young said. “I feel very bad about that. ... At least they get health care, but they don’t always get it at Wilford Hall or Brooke Army Medical Center [at Fort Sam Houston, Texas].”

While the care offered by civilian providers through Tricare is as good as that on base, many airmen, retirees and their families prefer to receive care in the military system.

Besides the convenience of not leaving base for an appointment, Air Force medical personnel are also more flexible and attuned to airmen’s needs, said Capt. Michael McCarter, a physician assistant with the 377th Medical Group at Kirtland.

“A majority of them prefer to get their care with the military system,” he said. “They get used to the number of issues that they can bring up compared to [with] our civilian counterparts. Generally speaking, if you get seen by a civilian provider outside our facility, it’s a one-complaint system and ... if you have additional things you have to make follow-up appointments.”

This is particularly problematic for retirees who must pay a co-pay to see civilian providers, McCarter said.

A greater sense of comfort comes along with the blue suit, McPherson said.

“There’s a huge sense of loyalty there,” she said. “It’s kind of your home. It’s a sense of family. We wrap our arms around you, and we’re going to take care of you.”

Raezer said the biggest problem with referring patients through Tricare is that they often find themselves bouncing between military and civilian doctors.

“The continuity-of-care issue is a concern if you’ve got a beneficiary going back and forth,” she said.

A patient in such a situation may not be able to establish a relationship with an individual doctor for ongoing needs, Raezer said, and medical records don’t always flow back and forth between civilian and military providers as efficiently as they should.

Staffing shortages lead to longer hours and a more hectic pace for medical personnel as base facilities struggle to keep up with patient loads, several medical airmen said.

At Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., the base hospital’s family medicine residency clinic was short three or four of its 14 medical technicians until filling the holes recently with civilian contractors.

“It can be a little bit more stressful,” said Senior Airman Fawn Hill, a medical technician in the clinic who is assigned to the 96th Medical Operations Squadron. “Sometimes we’d double up with two different doctors ... so we’re just constantly running around taking care of both doctors’ needs. It’s more work obviously, but it gets done.”

Hill said she often would cut her lunch break short or work longer hours to keep up with the workload.

Staff Sgt. Jason Grott, a reservist and medical technician with the 349th Aeromedical Staging Squadron at Travis Air Force Base, Calif., said his unit has been hit hard by increased deployments during the past couple of years, leaving those remaining stateside to pick up the slack.

“Instead of leaving at 5 o’clock, we’ll end up staying till 7, 8, 9 o’clock or even later,” he said. “Additionally ... a lot of the people are finding themselves doing more duties, [so] they’ll end up coming in additional days. ... It can be trying at times, [but] it is a grin-and-bear-it thing.”

Despite the enlisted airmen’s upbeat attitudes, McPherson said the workload does wear down her unit’s personnel.

“There’s no doubt that when you’re short, everybody has to pull a bit harder and work a bit longer to make up for it,” she said. “I don’t think anybody minds if it’s a deployment, [but] when it’s the day-to-day constant shortage of nursing, that starts to wear on you.”
 
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USAFdoc;4941252 “There’s no doubt that when you’re short said:
when it’s the day-to-day constant shortage of nursing, that starts to wear on you.”


Most primary care docs are very familiar with what is called the "open access" model of office management. Basically, you promise patients that you are able to see them on the day they want to be seen, more specifically, you have "unlimited" same day appointments.

My base promised this to our patients despite the chronic undermanning that is descibed above. One of our Commanders received some award for implementing this at our base.

It was a total fiasco and failure. Trying to implement open access in todays typical military primary care clinic is like trying to have an outdoor wedding during a hurricane.:eek: :laugh:

sad but true:mad:
 
Unfortunately, SDN has made it onto the "Restricted Access" sites at least in the AF so I will no longer be able to vent from work. I hope to be able to continue to keep up from home at night but I have so much going on there, I doubt I'll be able to do much.

Just wanted to say how much I appreciated this forum and the chance it gave me to learn I'm not alone in my criticisms of milmed. I'll chime in when I get the opportunity, but if I'll probably happen to miss out on many good discussions.

Later all.
 
Unfortunately, SDN has made it onto the "Restricted Access" sites at least in the AF so I will no longer be able to vent from work.
Just wanted to say how much I appreciated this forum and the chance it gave me to learn I'm not alone in my criticisms of milmed. I'll chime in when I get the opportunity, but if I'll probably happen to miss out on many good discussions.

1) Restricted access site? Guess word is getting around.:love:
2) About the only people "alone" are those defending "wonderful milmed". Amazing how so many of those that were slamming the docs on this site have disappeared:idea:

3) Fresh article below discussing "morale problems in milmed". Wow it only took a decade; a Walter Reed scandal, and a nurse as a Surgeon General to finally "fess up".
WASHINGTON - The Army's new acting surgeon general said Tuesday she is concerned about long-term morale because the military lacks money........Bush has appointed a presidential task force to study the problems and a slew of reviews are under way by the Pentagon, VA and several congressional committees. But troops and veterans say many of the issues are well known and have long been in need of response.................Sen. Patty Murray (news, bio, voting record), D-Wash., said "I've just about had it with administration officials who assure us everything is being taken care of," Murray said. "I know you work hard, but we are going to judge you by the results you get for our veterans, and we're going to hold you accountable.":idea: :love:

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070327/ap_on_go_co/veterans_care
 
:scared: :sleep:
Unfortunately, SDN has made it onto the "Restricted Access" sites at least in the AF so I will no longer be able to vent from work. I hope to be able to continue to keep up from home at night but I have so much going on there, I doubt I'll be able to do much.

Just wanted to say how much I appreciated this forum and the chance it gave me to learn I'm not alone in my criticisms of milmed. I'll chime in when I get the opportunity, but if I'll probably happen to miss out on many good discussions.

Later all.
1. Psst: everything you do on a government computer is transparent and searchable - ...... perhaps you shouldn't be posting on a government computer. Actually, it is illegal..... ooops.
2. Did you record your SDN time in your 80 hour work week?
I'm going to import some emoticons for USAFdoc - he/she seems to like them. :) :( :oops: :D ;) :p :cool:
 
1. Psst: everything you do on a government computer is transparent and searchable - ...... perhaps you shouldn't be posting on a government computer. Actually, it is illegal..... ooops.
2. Did you record your SDN time in your 80 hour work week?
I'm going to import some emoticons for USAFdoc - he/she seems to like them.

1) Psst: facticious newswire; SDN activities punishable under UCMJ, USAF Captain gets brig time...newswire; USAF Surgeon General lies to congress, runs milmed into the ground, saps morale, endangers patients and earns coveted Gold medal of honor.

2) there are no "MPERS" numbers for SDN, but perhaps they are coming out soon. Rumor has it that new MPERS numbers will allow the USAF to track how many minutes a day physicians are "going #1, going #2, minutes showering with the water running, intimate moments with spouse, and time spent contemplating the wonderful attributes of milmed admin. Stay tuned.:love: :laugh: :thumbup:
 
:scared: :sleep:
1. Psst: everything you do on a government computer is transparent and searchable - ...... perhaps you shouldn't be posting on a government computer. Actually, it is illegal..... ooops.
2. Did you record your SDN time in your 80 hour work week?
I'm going to import some emoticons for USAFdoc - he/she seems to like them. :) :( :oops: :D ;) :p :cool:

1 - Everything I do on a government computer is pretty much a waste of time including the use of AHLTA. In fact, I'd argue I waste more time on AHLTA trying to fix stupid bugs than I ever spend on the internet whether it's SDN, sermo, SI, or msnbc.com.

2 - Thanks for veiled threats from a stub of the system. Proves my point about the garbage this defunct machine churns out daily.
 
Put yet another way...here as a civdoc, I am the "pilot of the plane" and in the milmed system the doc is the "engine". (and many time we are the engine put at full tilt while admin has the brakes on, the wings missing, etc...and being blamed by admin that the plane just wont get airborne.)

Brand new article where President Bush apologizes for the state of "broken milmed".............full article link below. Best(worst) quotes highlighted below.

"Walter Reed is not a photo-op," Muller said. "Walter Reed is still broken. The DOD health care system is still broken. ... Our troops need their commander in chief to start working harder for them.":idea:

"The problems at Walter Reed were caused by bureaucratic and administrative failures," the president told about 100 medical workers and patients at the hospital. "The system failed you and it failed our troops and we're going to fix it.":idea:

"It is not right to have someone volunteer to wear the uniform and not get the best possible care," the president said at the end of his more than two-hour visit, cut short from its planned length by almost an hour. "I apologize for what they went through and we're going to fix the problem.":thumbup:

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070330/ap_on_go_pr_wh/bush
 
1 - Everything I do on a government computer is pretty much a waste of time including the use of AHLTA. In fact, I'd argue I waste more time on AHLTA trying to fix stupid bugs than I ever spend on the internet whether it's SDN, sermo, SI, or msnbc.com.

2 - Thanks for veiled threats from a stub of the system. Proves my point about the garbage this defunct machine churns out daily.


I'm logged in at work...holding breath...haven't been arrested yet...whew. AHLTA fix of the week: if you suddenly can't code for anything but a nonprovider encounter, just switch the location from outpt to outpt observation and back, and ta-da, its fixed.
 
I'm logged in at work...holding breath...haven't been arrested yet...whew. QUOTE]

It looks like alot of people have been holding thier breath over at Walter Reed since 2003, waiting for things to improve.:eek: :eek:


As far back as 2003, Lt. Gen. Kevin C. Kiley, then Walter Reed's commander and "who is now the Army's top medical officer, was told that soldiers who were wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan were languishing and lost on the grounds, according to interviews.

Sad.:(
 

another opinion from the BLOGosphere...................


Since nobody has really talked much about this from the health care side, I'll chime in. I briefly considered taking a HPSP scholarship where uncle sam covers med school and then owns your ass for a few years, so I talked to a bunch of milmed guys. To a man they all love their patients and hate their jobs. The problems of health care administration on the civilian side are a thousand times worse on the military side because it's precisely the people who are worst at clinical care that rise into administration where they set the rules. Some of the stories I heard were fxxxxxxx absurd and some of the things they were ordered to do were borderline criminally negligent, which is the real reason I didn't take it. Operating without sufficient staff, operating outside scope of practice, having dangerous anesthesia guidelines set by nurse administrators who hadn't even practiced in 20 years, it was fxxxxxxx ridiculous.

Milmed is headed towards a crisis as physician retention is heading towards 0%, doctors lose money if they take Tricare so participation drops every year and they can't give away HPSP scholarships nowadays. On the up side, maybe this means drastic changes will happen. Or perhaps they'll just find some scapegoats and fire them, that should cover it.

http://messageboard.tuckermax.com/showthread.php?t=14675&page=9
 
they played that open access crap right before I got out. It really doesn't work for something like an AIT or basic training post. It's a new version of the stress card... when ever something happens during your training day that gets your panties in a wad, you just drop everything and go to the doctor.

It's a freaking joke and I'm not playing it anymore. To hell with all of them.



Most primary care docs are very familiar with what is called the "open access" model of office management. Basically, you promise patients that you are able to see them on the day they want to be seen, more specifically, you have "unlimited" same day appointments.

My base promised this to our patients despite the chronic undermanning that is descibed above. One of our Commanders received some award for implementing this at our base.

It was a total fiasco and failure. Trying to implement open access in todays typical military primary care clinic is like trying to have an outdoor wedding during a hurricane.:eek: :laugh:

sad but true:mad:
 
they played that open access crap right before I got out. It really doesn't work for something like an AIT or basic training post. It's a new version of the stress card... when ever something happens during your training day that gets your panties in a wad, you just drop everything and go to the doctor.

Another "classic" from my base was the implementation of "total sick call."
Why do I call it "total sick call"? Because our Commander opened sick call (0645 start) to everyone (civilians and military) and for all reasons (chest pain to sprained ankles). So you all can guess what happened........................we got a waiting room of 40+ patients at times, with typically one doc and a PA. On top of that we got regularly schuduled patients q 10-15 minutes starting at 0900. So, now you are still wading thru sick call at 0959, already one hour behind on your FIRST scheduled patient of the day!!!!!!

Another RIPLEY's BELIEVE it or NOT..:laugh: ....day in the life of USAF Primary Care.:(
 
Another "classic" :(

Below sad story (actually funny if it wasn't true). Military medicine seems to be on a roll now with removing the wrong part(s). First Walter Reed removes the "new" Commander there, when it really should have been the previous Commander all along (but he likely played military politics so well they made him the Army Surgeon General), and now the sad story of the "wrong testicle". Coincindence?.........I think not !!:eek: :eek: :idea: :laugh:

LOS ANGELES - A U.S. Air Force veteran has filed a federal claim after a healthy testicle was mistakenly removed instead of a potentially cancerous one during an operation.

Benjamin Houghton, 47, thought his left testicle, which was atrophied and painful, would be removed last June at a Veterans Administration hospital because there was a chance the testicle could harbor cancer cells.

But doctors removed his right testicle, according to medical records and the claim, which seeks $200,000 for future care and unspecified damages. He still has not had the other testicle removed.

"At first I thought it was a joke," Houghton told the Los Angeles Times. "Then I was shocked. I told them, 'What do I do now?'"

http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,131220,00.html

Head of Walter Reed Hospital Fired
Associated Press | March 02, 2007
WASHINGTON - The Army said Thursday that the two-star general in charge of Walter Reed Army Medical Center has been relieved of command following disclosures about inadequate treatment of wounded soldiers.

Maj. Gen. George W. Weightman, who was commanding general of the North Atlantic Regional Medical Command as well as Walter Reed hospital, was relieved of command by Army Secretary Francis J. Harvey.

In a brief announcement, the Army said service leaders had "lost trust and confidence" in Weightman's leadership abilities "to address needed solutions for soldier outpatient care" at Walter Reed.



Video: Walter Reed General Relieved

The Army and the Defense Department launched a series of investigations after The Washington Post published a series of stories last week that documented problems in soldiers' housing and in the medical bureaucracy at Walter Reed, which has been called the Army's premier caregiver for soldiers wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Alert: Let your public officials know how you feel about this issue!

After a visit to the hospital compound last Friday, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said those found to have been responsible for the problems at Walter Reed would be "held accountable."

"A bedrock principle of our military system is that we empower commanders with the responsibility, authority and resources necessary to carry out their mission," Gates said at the time. "With responsibility comes accountability."

A Pentagon spokesman, Bryan Whitman, said before the action against Weightman was announced that an outside review panel created by Gates was holding its first meeting Friday at the Pentagon. Headed by two former Army secretaries, Togo West and Jack Marsh, the panel is to review treatment and administrative processes at Walter Reed and at the National Naval Medical Center at Bethesda, Md. Gates has instructed the group to report its findings publicly within 45 days.

Being relieved of command means Weightman is almost certain to have lost his future in the Army.

http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,127057,00.html
 

"Returning" troops certainly deserve better than this, but they are not the only ones facing a beuracracy nightmare. ANYBODY involved with milmed can relate to this one.:thumbdown: :(


http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20070414/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/veterans_care


WASHINGTON - Injured soldiers returning home for medical treatment face an unacceptable maze of paperwork and bureaucracy, leaders of a presidential commission on veterans' health care said Saturday.

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At their first public hearing, members pledged to work quickly to find solutions rather than assign blame.

"This is not going to be a witch hunt," said former GOP Sen. Bob Dole of Kansas, one of the heads of the Commission on Care for America's Returning Wounded Warriors.

Dole noted that at least nine congressional committees are investigating veterans' health care problems after the disclosures in February of squalid conditions and poor outpatient treatment at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington.

Donna Shalala, health and human services secretary under President Clinton, said the commission planned a report by late July that would be pragmatic and "solution-driven."

"Our timelines for action is very short," she said. As a result, she said commissioners may not be able to visit every military hospital and Veterans Affairs Department clinic to examine conditions.

Shalala said the commission would set up a Web site and telephone hot line and encourage veterans to express their concerns.

The commission heard from three of its members who experienced problems after they or their spouses were injured in Iraq.

Jose Ramos, a student at George Mason University in Virginia, lost an arm during combat in 2004. He praised the medical care at Walter Reed — once he could get an appointment.

He described having to wait four hours after a scheduled appointment to get in, as well as rescheduling follow-up visits.

"I constantly had to re-explain my symptoms and medical history. It was like starting all over again every time I had an appointment," Ramos said.

Navigating the VA system was just as bad, Ramos said. "The VA system, much like the military medical outprocessing system, is a labyrinth of offices and paperwork that no one seems to want to help with."

Tammy Edwards said the commission's final report would recommend ways to alleviate burdens on families. In 2005, her husband, a U.S. Army staff sergeant, was severely burned in Iraq when a 500-pound bomb exploded under his vehicle.

Spouses often most drop everything to provide care, and parents and grandparents frequently change their way of life because of the burdens, Edwards said.

"I have watched several marriages fall apart because the spouses did not receive the emotional support necessary to help them through such a challenging time," Edwards said.

When President Bush named Dole and Shalala to head the panel, he said the nation has "a moral obligation to provide the best possible care and treatment to the men and women who served our country."

In recent days, an independent review found that money problems and Pentagon neglect could be blamed for numerous problems found at Walter Reed, including poor outpatient care and haphazard follow-up.

A different panel has raised questions about whether injured soldiers might be shortchanged by the system used for rating their disabilities. Critics say the Pentagon has a strong incentive to assign ratings so the military won't have to pay disability benefits.
 
Gentlemen,

Would you be willing to provide guidance and sound advice to a young 0-1 with 8 years of service in the USN?

This is my dilemma:

After serving active duty in the navy for 8 years, I have decided that I not longer want to be in my community. I was prior enlisted for four years, then I went to school to get a Mechanical Engineering degree under the collegiate program--active duty while going to college, hence 8 years of active duty.
I plan to apply to med school next year and become an ortho. I know that the Navy has great scholarship programs--USUHS and HPSP, and pretty much can come out of school debt free. But...

I'm from Texas and if I get accepted in one of the state schools, I don't have to pay any tuition because I would be considered a veteran and the state pays for the majority of the fees and tuition--this scholarship is called the Hazelwood program.
http://www.collegefortexans.com/cfbin/tofa2.cfm?id=31


My question to you gentlemen is:

Is it cost effective to leave the military after racking in 10 yrs of active duty and transfer to the civilian life and finish Med school as a civilian with no strings attached?

I ran some numbers and according to BUPERS, after twenty years of service I can earn $4.0M in retirement--40 yrs. :idea: and If I go to USUHS I can earn income while going to school $240K. That is a lot of $$$

If I get out… I have to live with no income while going to school, I loose my retirement, and have to pay for some very minor fees in school.

What are the pros and cons of getting out at this point? and how hard is to get the residency of your choice in the Navy vs. Civilian, lets say I want one of the most competitive specialties--ortho, rad, anesthesia.

Thanks for your help. I have to make the big decision next year .:thumbup:
 
Gentlemen,

Would you be willing to provide guidance and sound advice to a young 0-1 with 8 years of service in the USN?

This is my dilemma:

After serving active duty in the navy for 8 years, I have decided that I not longer want to be a civil engineering officer. I was prior enlisted for four years, then I went to school to get a Mechanical Engineering degree under the collegiate program--active duty while going to college, hence 8 years of active duty.
I plan to apply to med school next year and become an ortho. I know that the Navy has great scholarship programs--USUHS and HPSP, and pretty much can come out of school debt free. But...

I'm from Texas and if I get accepted in one of the state schools, I don't have to pay any tuition because I would be considered a veteran and the state pays for the majority of the fees and tuition--this scholarship is called the Hazelwood program.
http://www.collegefortexans.com/cfbin/tofa2.cfm?id=31


My question to you gentlemen is:

Is it cost effective to leave the military after racking in 10 yrs of active duty and transfer to the civilian life and finish Med school as a civilian with no strings attached?

I ran some numbers and according to BUPERS, after twenty years of service I can earn $4.0M in retirement--40 yrs. :idea: and If I go to USUHS I can earn income while going to school $240K. That is a lot of $$$

If I get out… I have to live with no income while going to school, I loose my retirement, and have to pay for some very minor fees in school.

What are the pros and cons of getting out at this point? and how hard is to get the residency of your choice in the Navy vs. Civilian, lets say I want one of the most competitive specialties--ortho, rad, anesthesia.

Thanks for your help. I have to make the big decision next year .:thumbup:


You need to thoroughly review this forum. The first thing you are going to find is that NO ONE, will recommend you do this for the money. I think someone might dispute your figures. I certainly do not see how you would make 240K during med school??????

As an attending orthopod, especially if you subspecialize, you can make more than half a million a year. If you go to the Navy, you will take a dice roll whether you will even get to be an orthopod, as you are likely to be a GMO for an undeterminate amount of time, plus you will owe 8 years coming out of USHUS, and if you do eventually get to ortho, you will not make more than 150K for a long time, that is in addition to the time you will acrue for your residency if you ever get the change to get one. (The last statement, I'm not 100% sure about, whether you get added time during residency.) But I am 100% sure that during that time, (5-6 yrs). you will not be paying back any of the time you owe.

Couple that with the HORRIBLE state that military medicine is in now, and you have a recipee for potential disaster, dissapointment, total letdown.

Now, you suffer a bit through med school, get good ortho training, and become a good orthopod, and then you revisit where military medicine is at. You could come back in as a LtCol (?navy rank), get your time in towards retirement, if you think that at that time its worth it to you.

You close way too many doors going into mil med at this point in time.
 
Gentlemen,


What are the pros and cons of getting out at this point? and how hard is to get the residency of your choice in the Navy vs. Civilian, lets say I want one of the most competitive specialties--ortho, rad, anesthesia.

Thanks for your help. I have to make the big decision next year .:thumbup:

General answer: Take your Texas med school education and run run run. If you change your mind and end up in a primary care specialty where that military retirement ends up looking worthwhile, you can always come back in via FAP (you won't, but you could).

Now specifically for this part of your question: mil med is fairly representative of the larger med school population in terms of competitiveness but there is more year by year variation. On the plus side for mil med, you get bonus points for your prior nonmedical service at the GMESB. So, some years it can be easier, others it can be harder. Also, realize that if you choose Navy, you will assuredly do a GMO tour between internship and residency.

BTW, why are you becoming a doctor? I have to say I'm a little suspicious of the motivations of anyone who is interested in three high paying but otherwise utterly different specialties. If you're doing this for the money, you may not be very happy in a decade or two. I think you really have to love the science to avoid getting burned out. You also might consider dentistry.
 
The state of Texas is going to pay for your education? And you're still considering HPSP??

My good man... are you daft? Have you truly lost your mind? Run like hell and don't do HPSP. If you still want to do the military by the time you get out of residency (you won't), then you can do the FAP program.

Civilian Ortho guys do very well financially, and you'll rapidly make up any perceived income gap.
 
The state of Texas is going to pay for your education? And you're still considering HPSP??

My good man... are you daft? Have you truly lost your mind? Run like hell and don't do HPSP. If you still want to do the military by the time you get out of residency (you won't), then you can do the FAP program.

Civilian Ortho guys do very well financially, and you'll rapidly make up any perceived income gap.

1. Absolutely the WORST choice for this guy would be to go HPSP. Even besides all the "beurocratic demise" rotting milmed, this guy might not even be able to do ortho as the USAF will decide what he will do.

2. Below are 2 exceptional threads that describe in detail how milmed found its way into the gutter. Anyone thinking about milmed needs to read these.

There once was this unwritten understanding that the discrepency in pay between military physician and civilian pay was offset by professional and personnal benefits of military service. For example, work hours were generally less, hassles (insurance, billing etc) less, and the system worked much like a traditional academic medicine system with time for CME, GME and research.

Then the HMO craze started becoming the norm in the civ sector so the government started to try to apply civilian performance metrics on military providers with providing them with any of the resources and incentives that HMO's provided their docs.

Roughtly the same time the bean counters figured, hey let's unload the retirees - and make them use medicare and go civilian - not a good move for residencies or for subspecialists who need old people with old people diseases.

They started collecting bogus metrics ala UCAPERS, RVU's, whatever which were based on totally erroneous data. With flawed data, they started to cut positions since it was so apparent to them that we (military docs) were a bunch of inefficient dolts. Panels increased, and life got really bad for the primary care docs in particular. Time for research disappeared and lifestyles were degraded....

JCAHO then became this plaque that appeared and administrative requirements went through the roof. As we increasingly lost sight of the real mission PATIENT CARE, we started to alot days for sexual harrassment training, Consideration of other training, NO FEAR training, Ethics, Customer service, Sex abuse responder training, HIPAA, CBRNE and a zillion other training requirements which only served to degrade patient care further. We have closed my clinic several times this year to try to get this generally useless training accomplished.

Guess what? The "benefits" of military service - quality of life, access to training, research etc, disappeared and people started to head for the exits. The exodus wasn't really noticed because we had like 8 years worth of docs in the pipeline either in residency, or obligated through HPSP or USUHS. Adding the "War on Terror", to the mix further demoralized staff especially as deployment decisions were in many ways not equitable, and the increased workload required on nondeployed staff ballooned. Then, more headed for the exits (more than could be filled by HPSP and USUHS accessions). Add to that the decrease in HPSP enrollment in the past 2 years and in 4-5 years you face a cataclysmic collapse in the system.

So where are we? In a very bad place.

Attempts to privatize military healthcare or high civilian contractors is almost uniformly a failing enterprise. Let's face it, the civilian job marked it very tight and pay higher there, so who do we end up hiring? A bunch of FMG's who have no buy-in to the system and don't feel any particular ownership or appreciation for the military beneficiary.

I wish I had reason to be more optimistic but our rating systems do not allow for the best and brightest to become policy makers and GO's, thus in some respects the crap floats to the top. Lastly because we do not have a seperate funding stream distinct from that where beans and bullets are procured, there will always be attempts to raid medical funds to support ongoing combat ops - further degrading care and morale.

My solution - a unified medical command, a competely seperate budget stream, a rating scheme which is based on clinical skills/excellence, bedside manner, in addition to administrative skills. Protected and dedicated funds to each doc for CME. Reasonable work hour guidelines, taking into account mission creep - "do more with less".

From my perspective in the AF, the big decline started in the mid-90’s when I was an MS4—PGY1. This was the period when Tricare began and our whole military healthcare paradigm changed. Before that, the Air Force tried to run a comprehensive, cradle-to-grave healthcare system, which took care of nearly all its beneficiaries in-house. There was a large network of smaller hospitals which referred a complex care to the larger med centers—robust institutions with a high volume of complex cases from all over the country and the world. In the Early 90’s, places like Wilford hall, NNMC, and Walter Reed were massive 700-1000 bed hospitals. Then post-Tricare, the priorities shifted to cost-control, and providing essential medical services to active-duty personnel. Smaller hospitals were shuttered and non-active-duty patients were increasingly sent to civilian providers. Referrals to the major medical centers dried up, and they downsized accordingly—becoming essentially mid-size community hospitals. Once-busy hospital wards were turned into offices for managers who handled the Tricare contracts. At the base where I was stationed, we went from a 250-bed hospital with CT surgery, Interventional cardiology, oncology, etc; to a 30-bed “super-clinic” with minimal subspecialty services. This took place over a four-year period from 1996-2000. The Air-Force seems to be out front with the whole downsizing program, so I suspect that the Army and Navy started later. The war seems to have accelerated the downward spiral, but it began well before 9/11.
 
I like how you've made A1 a chief proponent of military medicines terminal woes. I can't wait to see what kind of responce we get here.
 
I can't wait to see what kind of responce we get here.

I swear he's one of the most erratic posters on this forum, yet in his own way, he's every bit as emphatic as the Corpse (TM).
 
I actually found it easier in a TOE unit. When I first arrived, I just let anybody walk in because I only had my unit to deal with.

The 1SG unilaterally put a stop to that. He took it upon himself to order the Senior Medical NCO of the unit to screen soldiers back at the unit before they even reached the TMC.

that was Korea and If my wife wouldn't have kept nagging me, I would have gladly sat out 3 year of my committment there no problem.


We had a trend where unsponsored dependents started showing up in area 1 TMC. I discouraged it, sent them to Seoul, and I could care less if it pissed them off down there or not. There is an up and down side to being in a line unit. You sleep in the mud more, but you aren't an HMO clone either. Those guys down in the rear can't have the condo and the nice pt panel at the same time, even if they think they're one of God's chosen people.


Another "classic" from my base was the implementation of "total sick call."
Why do I call it "total sick call"? Because our Commander opened sick call (0645 start) to everyone (civilians and military) and for all reasons (chest pain to sprained ankles). So you all can guess what happened........................we got a waiting room of 40+ patients at times, with typically one doc and a PA. On top of that we got regularly schuduled patients q 10-15 minutes starting at 0900. So, now you are still wading thru sick call at 0959, already one hour behind on your FIRST scheduled patient of the day!!!!!!

Another RIPLEY's BELIEVE it or NOT..:laugh: ....day in the life of USAF Primary Care.:(
 
I actually found it easier in a TOE unit.

FYI Alpha; 100% of FPs preferred deployed to the middle east over being in the stateside clinic.(our clinic)(:idea:
Korea is maybe even better than that (Iraq).

and I could care less if it pissed them off down there or not.

Alpha; FYI #2; I thank God that you are not my FP doc, and not my colleague. I completely disagree with your attitude here. Yes, you need to draw the line somewhere, but "I could not care less" :thumbdown: :thumbdown: will never be said by me about any patient, ever.

Those guys down in the rear can't have the condo and the nice pt panel at the same time, even if they think they're one of God's chosen people.

Your quote about "God's chosen people" likely has more to say about you than it does us "guys down in the rear". Why you find it necessary to attempt to belittle physicians stateside is a bit strange, but consistent with much of your response.:idea: :thumbdown:
 
Probably the only good thing to come out of this war was it hopefully put an end to the dumb ass "house of god" blocking games that a lot of the REMFs would try to carry on into the operational side.

About 1/4 of the way through the tour I stopped trying to bargan with the rear area evac guy like some kind of a freaking HMO pre-certification ritual.

You must have run into this before, as it got a rise out of you.


Your quote about "God's chosen people" likely has more to say about you than it does us "guys down in the rear". Why you find it necessary to attempt to belittle physicians stateside is a bit strange, but consistent with much of your response.:idea: :thumbdown:
 
Probably the only good thing to come out of this war was it hopefully put an end to the dumb ass "house of god" blocking games that a lot of the REMFs would try to carry on into the operational side.

About 1/4 of the way through the tour I stopped trying to bargan with the rear area evac guy like some kind of a freaking HMO pre-certification ritual.

You must have run into this before, as it got a rise out of you.

1)never read "House of God", never dealt with REMFs.

2)frequently dealt with REAL HMO pre-cert "rituals" coutesy of TRICARE (TRY-and see if I CARE).
 
it's an army thing. the people that by luck of the draw who get MTF Twisted pretzel slots seem to start thinking they were smarter than everybody else, that's why they were selected for the medcen slots instead of going to the line.

How could you have not read the House of God at this point in your development ?


1)never read "House of God", never dealt with REMFs.

2)frequently dealt with REAL HMO pre-cert "rituals" coutesy of TRICARE (TRY-and see if I CARE).
 
it's an army thing. the people that by luck of the draw who get MTF Twisted pretzel slots seem to start thinking they were smarter than everybody else, that's why they were selected for the medcen slots instead of going to the line.

How could you have not read the House of God at this point in your development ?

1) can't say I have met many FPs with that attitude (smarter because of where they got stationed).

2) never felt the need to spend time reading that book. I had heard about it, sounded like a book about the "God" personality that some surgeons are reputed to have.
 
The "God" in The House of God does not refer to the surgeons' superiority complex. The House of God is a euphemism for a Jewish hospital. The author used lots of nicknames for people and places to avoid libel.
 
The "God" in The House of God does not refer to the surgeons' superiority complex. The House of God is a euphemism for a Jewish hospital. The author used lots of nicknames for people and places to avoid libel.

thanks for the long overdue FYI.

Wikipedia below:love:

Dr Roy Basch is a new intern in a hospital called the House of God, after completing his medical studies at the BMS ("Best Medical School"). He is poorly prepared for the grueling hours and the sudden responsibilities without much guidance from senior doctors. He survives the year (unlike a colleague, who commits suicide) due to various factors: his girlfriend Berry, various adulterous relationships with nurses (portrayed in great detail), and an enigmatic resident who goes by the name The Fat Man. The latter provides his patrons with wisdom such as the "Laws of the House of God" (which amount to 13 by the end of the book). The book finishes when it turns out that the psychiatry resident, Cohen, has managed to inspire almost the whole year's group of interns to pursue a career in psychiatry.


[edit] Laws of the House of God
GOMERS DON’T DIE.
GOMERS GO TO GROUND.
AT A CARDIAC ARREST, THE FIRST PROCEDURE IS TO TAKE YOUR OWN PULSE.
THE PATIENT IS THE ONE WITH THE DISEASE.
PLACEMENT COMES FIRST.
THERE IS NO BODY CAVITY THAT CANNOT BE REACHED WITH A #14 NEEDLE AND A GOOD STRONG ARM.
AGE + BUN = LASIX DOSE.
THEY CAN ALWAYS HURT YOU MORE.
THE ONLY GOOD ADMISSION IS A DEAD ADMISSION.
IF YOU DON’T TAKE A TEMPERATURE, YOU CAN’T FIND A FEVER.
SHOW ME A MEDICAL STUDENT WHO ONLY TRIPLES MY WORK AND I WILL KISS HIS FEET.
IF THE RADIOLOGY RESIDENT AND THE MEDICAL STUDENT BOTH SEE A LESION ON THE CHEST X-RAY, THERE CAN BE NO LESION THERE.
THE DELIVERY OF GOOD MEDICAL CARE IS TO DO AS MUCH NOTHING AS POSSIBLE.

[edit] Context and impact
The book is very likely autobiographical, with the BMS being Harvard Medical School (commonly called HMS), and The House of God is Beth Israel Hospital now a part of Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, one of the HMS-affiliated hospitals in Boston, Massachusetts.

It is very likely that some details have been exaggerated (such as an orgy in the resuscitation room), but upon its appearance, many American doctors felt that the story resonated with their own experiences during their internship training.

Several of the concepts developed in the book have found their way into the jargon of junior hospital staff:

To Turf (verb: to find an excuse to refer a patient to a different department or team)
To Bounce (verb: a turf that has returned to its first department)
Gomer (noun: Get Out of My Emergency Room - a patient who is frequently admitted with complicated but uninspiring and incurable conditions)
LOL in NAD (noun: Little Old Lady in No Apparent Distress - an elderly patient who following a minor fall or illness, would be better served by staying at home with good social support, rather than being admitted into a hospital with all the iatrogenic risks of modern medicine. A joke on 'NAD' abbreviation of 'No Abnormality Detected' used to record the absence of abnormal signs on examination).
Zebra (noun: a very unlikely diagnosis where a more common disease would be more likely to cause a patient's symptoms - from the common admonition that "if you hear hoofbeats, don't think of zebras").
 
I read House of God during my third year of med school. I got so depressed after I read it I nearly quit altogether. It was all so true, so depressingly, futilely true...

When my younger sister started med school, I emphatically warned her not to read that book until she reached attending level.
 
The House of God is one of my all-time favorites. It's very funny and I never stopped laughing. Of course, I was just a pre-med at the time. I might look at the book differently in the future. However, the best correlation I can draw is that The House is like Catch-22 goes to residency.

There a second book, Mount Misery, which covers the PGY-2 year. That book was not nearly as funny, and it ran about 150 pages longer than it should have.
 
House of God is a great book.

The other one I recommend (for students and resident in EM) is The Rape of Emergency Medicine, written by the pseudonymous "Dr. Phoenix" (Jim Keaney is the real author).

The latter is mandatory reading for ANY emergency medicine resident.
 
I think I have been very consistent in my posts .. at least the sober ones.

Believe me, my earlier posts have alluded to my own frustrations and dissappointments with the system. I have never taken the tack that the military is a great place to practice medicine. It is however a very important place to practice medicine.

I have tried to make the fundamental point that as the system is essential to national security and the welfare of about a million sons and daughters of this great country. We all can't just opt out of participating. I also would argue that we have always had a dysfunctional bureauocracy since the dawn of US military medicine. Just look to history, of how underfunded, and poorly administered military medicine has been at just about any time period.

I have seen things change albeit in small yet tangible ways and usually not system wide. With that frame of reference I have attempted to point out the inconsistencies of most other posters here, extolling HPSP applicants not to join as a means of "changing the system" and strangely thinking this will somehow improve care for servicemembers.

I have now seen probably 100 great colleagues leave the military and I supported them, as they in effect "did their time" for our servicemembers and contributed. I have decided to "stick it out" perhaps in the deluded idealism that I can effect some change from within.

I hold on the belief that if you can give a Commander a easy fix which makes them look good, they will generally adopt it so long as there isn't much personal risk to them. It is unfortunate that the O-6's in the system - those who run hospitals and have no real reason to care about fit-reps, are the ones who seem to lack personal courage. I mean, what is to be lost by telling a General or Undersecretary that - they are flat out wrong, here is why, and he's how to fix it?? You retire with 22 years of service vs 23 and don't get a medal on retirement??

There should be something empowering in being able to argue your point, stick to your guns and if you get "fired" for it you are punished by making more money, in a more supportive environment, and no longer have to deploy etc. Where's the downside?

I'm like come on, nut up COL's, and shake some trees for the good of the soldiers and your subordinate doctors/nurses etc.
 
House of God is a great book.

The other one I recommend (for students and resident in EM) is The Rape of Emergency Medicine, written by the pseudonymous "Dr. Phoenix" (Jim Keaney is the real author).

The latter is mandatory reading for ANY emergency medicine resident.

The Rape of Emergency Medicine was also a good read. It's the House set to an emergency department. You can download the PDF of it for free, too.
 
1) FACT: military stretched thin
2) FACT: USAF downsizing
3) FACT: USAF filling in to replace ARMY troops in IRAQ
4) FACT: USAF command decisions puzzling.:confused:

http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,132397,00.html?ESRC=airforce.nl

Air Force Fills Army Ranks
The training range is Army. But the young men and women clad in camouflage and helmets training to run and protect convoys are not Army -- they're Air Force. They are part of a small but steady stream of Airmen being trained to do Army duty under the Army chain of command....
 
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