Composition of the Medical Department Aboard the Navy’s New Expeditionary Medical Ships (EPF Flight II)?

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The first of the EPF Flight II Expeditionary Medical Ships, the USNS Cody, was just commissioned. I was interested to learn more about their medical capabilities and couldn’t find anything online beyond what‘s stated in the article: “two operating rooms, the ability to support approximately 41 medical patients, and 147 embarked forces”.

Does anyone know what the medical department will look like, specifically?

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The first of the EPF Flight II Expeditionary Medical Ships, the USNS Cody, was just commissioned. I was interested to learn more about their medical capabilities and couldn’t find anything online beyond what‘s stated in the article: “two operating rooms, the ability to support approximately 41 medical patients, and 147 embarked forces”.

Does anyone know what the medical department will look like, specifically?

I second that, I too would like to know more about them (mainly b/c I'm getting a little senior and may be tagged with one of these).

These hospital ships are a little silly IMHO. I prefer the gray hulls (USS types--CVN, LHA/D etc); their medical/surgical departments are more than capable. Plus it helps to be escorted by 1500 Marines and enough firepower to blow up a small continent.
 
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63fd1391c9863.image.jpg


Interesting looking ship.
 
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Interesting looking ship.

Uhh, yeah, I deployed on a ship like that once, called the HSV2 Swift. Here's what it looked like circa 2003:
1678150656955.png



and here's what it looked like after a 16-yo terrorist fired an RPG at it circa 2016:
1678150723669.png



No thanks! These catamaran-like ships are sitting ducks.
 
Does anyone know what the medical department will look like, specifically?

I haven’t seen anything that granular, but I believe they are meant to be adaptable to various “packages”. Tailored to a specific mission or desired support package, so might have different manning make-up.
 
Uhh, yeah, I deployed on a ship like that once, called the HSV2 Swift. Here's what it looked like circa 2003:
View attachment 367230


and here's what it looked like after a 16-yo terrorist fired an RPG at it circa 2016:
View attachment 367231


No thanks! These catamaran-like ships are sitting ducks.

I agree-I have some questions about the survivability of these and other expeditonary medical ships in an engagment with the Chinese in their territorial waters. The PLAN wants to fight a long-range no-contact battle with us and it seems they have every ability to do so with the incredible number of long-range anti-ship batteries (including hypersonic and ballistic missile which are difficult to intercept) they have situated on the Chinese mainland and along their first-island chain. Based on the wargaming I have seen, I think we are preparing to lose a lot of ships and we anticipate a lot of sailors and marines are going in the water.

While it sounds like the Navy is working to address concerns over this with these smaller, faster, and more maneuverable expeditionary transport ships like the EMS and EPF Flight IIs and larger numbers of casualty receiving and treatment ships (including a next generation hospital ship, the T-AHx) to increase our sea basing ability, I wonder if the PLA can distinguish these ships as non-combatants from a distance (assuming they follow the Geneva Convention). Our other Role 2-3 capable ships (CVAs, LHAs, LHDs, etc) would almost certainly be targets.

I also have to wonder about the sheer number we might need. The sinking of just one Nimitz Class Carrier for instance could quickly overwhelm the treatment and holding capacity of both of our existing hospital ships (with surge capacity of ~1000 patients each, if I remember correctly). It’s pretty reasonable to think that the PLA might strike our OCONUS bases in Japan and Guam early as well, to try and deter a US response to an invasion of Taiwan for instance. If so, we may not be able to evacuate patients to those hospitals for Role 3 care either. We might have to sea base all of these patients and if we do, we are going to need a larger fleet. As Admiral Charles Richard, Commander of USSTRATCOM, stated in a 2022 speech: “As I assess our level of deterrence against China…they are putting capability in the field faster than we are. As those curves keep going, it isn't going to matter how good our [operating plan] is or how good our commanders are, or how good our forces are—we're not going to have enough of them. And that is a very near-term problem”.

I hope Navy Medicine’s new campaign order is taken seriously and we are preparing for the challenges of patient care in a naval battle like we haven't seen since WWII.
 
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One more wrinkle for the issue above…who is going to man these additional ships? AD pulled from MTFs and OMOs/GMOs? Reserve mobilizations? We could completely degrade our MTFs with another couple of hospital ships deployed all at once alongside the Comfort and Mercy. Anyone that has been stationed at Portsmouth or San Diego knows what this is like for a department when half of their staff is underway.

And you thought I couldn’t work in the GMO/OMO issue into any Navy Medicine conversation?
 
I hope Navy Medicine’s new campaign order is taken seriously and we are preparing for the challenges of patient care in a naval battle like we haven't seen since WWII.

We're wasting our breath in such planning.

The United States and China are very unlikely to go to war with each other. Both countries are very dependent on each other (China is actually more dependent on the US), and both would be very gravely affected by an all-out war. China could invade Taiwan tomorrow and set the island on fire. All we're likely to do is issue heavy sanctions and maybe fight some proxy wars.

Furthermore, the American military right now is very undisciplined, undermanned, and unorderly. We know what, we have no means or will to fight an all-out war, no does the American public have an appetite for it. We seem to be much more concerned with 'diversity', inclusion, and holding everyone's hands each time they feel a little down . . . vs following orders and getting the job done. A McDonalds is run with more order and discipline.

So worry not about a war with China. We've got plenty of internal battles to fight.
 
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If we've learned anything in the last 20 years of supplying weapons and training to the likes of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Ukraine - it should be that the will of the people fighting makes the most difference.

Supplying a remote island like Taiwan after or during an attack will be impossible. So, we should be arming them to the teeth now. Among other things, helping them bury antiship missile batteries all over the place under massive amounts of concrete, and hiding mobile ones in plain sight everywhere, and arming cheap drones with them. Ensuring that they can defend themselves, if they have the will to do it. I hope they do.

China's not going to swim to Taiwan. Their ships are very vulnerable, but it wouldn't have to be our ships or aircraft sinking them. Moreover, there aren't a whole lot of beaches suitable for an invasion.

Lots of talk about how our ships are vulnerable to sinking at great distances. I don't know why people ignore the fact that China has the same problem, squared - there isn't any maneuver room in that tiny area between them and Taiwan.

China can destroy Taiwan without taking it, but that's not what they want, so they won't. And they can't take it by force, if Taiwan actually resists. Our best role is to ensure Taiwan can resist, if they have the will to do so.

For these reasons I don't see a shooting war ever breaking out over Taiwan, either with or without us directly involved.
 
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We're wasting our breath in such planning.

The United States and China are very unlikely to go to war with each other. Both countries are very dependent on each other (China is actually more dependent on the US), and both would be very gravely affected by an all-out war. China could invade Taiwan tomorrow and set the island on fire. All we're likely to do is issue heavy sanctions and maybe fight some proxy wars.

Furthermore, the American military right now is very undisciplined, undermanned, and unorderly. We know what, we have no means or will to fight an all-out war, no does the American public have an appetite for it. We seem to be much more concerned with 'diversity', inclusion, and holding everyone's hands each time they feel a little down . . . vs following orders and getting the job done. A McDonalds is run with more order and discipline.

So worry not about a war with China. We've got plenty of internal battles to fight.
Screenshot 2023-03-20 004036.jpg



Underfunded.
 
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Who'd have thought that a couple decades of war would cause the VA health system's costs to explode? Unfathomable and unpredictable. No way anyone could've seen that coming.

Underfunded.

The chief two problems are (1) there isn't any more money and (2) the root of the issue isn't money.

So the solution will need to involve ... not spending (a lot) more money. Maybe there are some shell games to spend money more wisely. Sure. Whatever.

But the obvious answer is to shift to a medical corps that is primarily reserve. This won't happen because the decisions will be made under the advice and influence of senior active duty people who'd rather put their fingers in a blender than admit any piece of the active duty force can or should be reduced.

There is plenty of demand for physicians in the civilian sector. It's insane that we are watching our active duty physicians, particularly those in surgical specialties, just ROT at military hospitals, and the best "solution" leaders come up with is the same handwaving bull**** about simulators and online CME and powerpoints highlighting "knowledge skills and abilities" and "civilian partnerships" and "resource sharing agreements" and "hey let's let some trauma in the gate" ... meanwhile we continue to defer care of sick and old people from MTFs to the surrounding civilian infrastructure that frequently struggles to carry the extra load.


I'm a 2002 USUHS grad and spent the next 20 years on active duty until retiring in 2022, deployed multiple times to Afghanistan and Iraq and other places. My busiest deployment was to the Role 3 in Kandahar when we typically saw multiple combat casualties per day. As an anesthesiologist I worked side by side with other US active and reserve and non-US/coalition anesthesiologists and other physicians ... and as great as my USUHS education was, I can't point to a SINGLE thing that I was able to do better than any of the others because I took some military studies classes as a MS1 and MS2, or because my practice in previous years was at a CONUS MTF. The Australians with us came from their country's reserve and their normal practice was at normal civilian hospitals in their home country. They were excellent. The most experienced US anesthesiologist with us was a reservist from the Univ of Florida.

The active duty MTFs don't need more funding. They need to be folded into the VA system and mostly staffed by civilians +/- reservists, and 90% of the active duty physicians either permanently stationed at civilian institutions or gradually shuffled into the reserves. So many of our residency programs are becoming mediocre or actually dying on the vine because of terrible case load - we can't spend our way back to excellence there even if there was money to throw around, which there isn't.

I spent the last 20 years watching the handwringing and helplessness of medical corps leadership as they failed to see (or care about?) this slow motion caseload and skillrot trainwreck developing and at best gave lip service to non-solutions. When I returned from FTOS fellowship and my MTF abruptly closed my new subspecialty line of care, I was the one who had to spend months hammering out a MOU with the VA to permit me to go work with them to scratch out a miniscule case load, and ultimately the only solution was for me to spend 90% of my leave for the next FIVE YEARS moonlighting simply to bite scratch and claw cases numbers to maintain the minimum load recommended by my board certifying authority.

It would take more than money to fix these fundamental problems with strategy, leadership, and force structure. Their first step needs to be admitting that they have a problem and that the proposed solutions of the last two decades aren't working and won't work.


That article you linked made a big deal about having a surgeon on a helicopter to put in a chest tube (or maybe it really was a field thoracotomy & pinky finger in a ventricle and not just journalistic embellishment), and I'm certainly glad that Ranger is alive and well today. But there's an important and clearheaded conversation that we should be having about the wisdom of having that sort of medical asset in the first place, i.e. if the cost and risk is really worth the once-in-a-decade edge case made-for-TV save like that. And of course ... completely unmentioned is the question of where that surgeon trained and practiced when he wasn't riding around in helicopters, and if future helicopter-surgeons (if they should exist at all!) should be twiddling their thumbs on active duty at Premier CONUS Army MTF or cranking out case after case as a reservist at Ordinary Civilian Hospital.

Funding isn't the problem.
 
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In case this detail was lost in the rant above, one of the primary assumptions that I think we need to be questioning is this idea that forward/in-theater combat casualty care is dependent upon, or even measurably improved by, a large active duty medical corps that exists in peacetime.

A lot of ink has been expended over the last 50 years talking about vague concepts like "institutional knowledge" and how we forget the lessons of previous conflicts that were learned with blood and sweat and tears, if everyone quits the service and demobilizes between conflicts. (This is the crux of the argument that justifies the existence of USUHS - that we need a core of career active duty military doctors lest we forget ATLS or modern transfusion practices, or something.)

And there's absolutely truth to this ... for the warfighters. They can't really practice, hone, and pass on their machinegunning and guided missile cruiser air defense skills if they demobilize and slide into a job selling cars or making cheese. But physicians who demobilize are still going to be working as physicians, and it's just nuts to pretend that they'll be ineffective doctors if they need to pivot to combat casualty care on short notice. As if there's some magic that infuses the break room water fountain at MTFs that doctors take with them to Role 2 and 3. No. Trauma is simple. Not always easy, but it's simple. All physicians who are on top of their game, coming from a busy practice, wherever that is, can effectively handle trauma.
 
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Who'd have thought that a couple decades of war would cause the VA health system's costs to explode? Unfathomable and unpredictable. No way anyone could've seen that coming.



The chief two problems are (1) there isn't any more money and (2) the root of the issue isn't money.

So the solution will need to involve ... not spending (a lot) more money. Maybe there are some shell games to spend money more wisely. Sure. Whatever.

But the obvious answer is to shift to a medical corps that is primarily reserve. This won't happen because the decisions will be made under the advice and influence of senior active duty people who'd rather put their fingers in a blender than admit any piece of the active duty force can or should be reduced.

There is plenty of demand for physicians in the civilian sector. It's insane that we are watching our active duty physicians, particularly those in surgical specialties, just ROT at military hospitals, and the best "solution" leaders come up with is the same handwaving bull**** about simulators and online CME and powerpoints highlighting "knowledge skills and abilities" and "civilian partnerships" and "resource sharing agreements" and "hey let's let some trauma in the gate" ... meanwhile we continue to defer care of sick and old people from MTFs to the surrounding civilian infrastructure that frequently struggles to carry the extra load.


I'm a 2002 USUHS grad and spent the next 20 years on active duty until retiring in 2022, deployed multiple times to Afghanistan and Iraq and other places. My busiest deployment was to the Role 3 in Kandahar when we typically saw multiple combat casualties per day. As an anesthesiologist I worked side by side with other US active and reserve and non-US/coalition anesthesiologists and other physicians ... and as great as my USUHS education was, I can't point to a SINGLE thing that I was able to do better than any of the others because I took some military studies classes as a MS1 and MS2, or because my practice in previous years was at a CONUS MTF. The Australians with us came from their country's reserve and their normal practice was at normal civilian hospitals in their home country. They were excellent. The most experienced US anesthesiologist with us was a reservist from the Univ of Florida.

The active duty MTFs don't need more funding. They need to be folded into the VA system and mostly staffed by civilians +/- reservists, and 90% of the active duty physicians either permanently stationed at civilian institutions or gradually shuffled into the reserves. So many of our residency programs are becoming mediocre or actually dying on the vine because of terrible case load - we can't spend our way back to excellence there even if there was money to throw around, which there isn't.

I spent the last 20 years watching the handwringing and helplessness of medical corps leadership as they failed to see (or care about?) this slow motion caseload and skillrot trainwreck developing and at best gave lip service to non-solutions. When I returned from FTOS fellowship and my MTF abruptly closed my new subspecialty line of care, I was the one who had to spend months hammering out a MOU with the VA to permit me to go work with them to scratch out a miniscule case load, and ultimately the only solution was for me to spend 90% of my leave for the next FIVE YEARS moonlighting simply to bite scratch and claw cases numbers to maintain the minimum load recommended by my board certifying authority.

It would take more than money to fix these fundamental problems with strategy, leadership, and force structure. Their first step needs to be admitting that they have a problem and that the proposed solutions of the last two decades aren't working and won't work.


That article you linked made a big deal about having a surgeon on a helicopter to put in a chest tube (or maybe it really was a field thoracotomy & pinky finger in a ventricle and not just journalistic embellishment), and I'm certainly glad that Ranger is alive and well today. But there's an important and clearheaded conversation that we should be having about the wisdom of having that sort of medical asset in the first place, i.e. if the cost and risk is really worth the once-in-a-decade edge case made-for-TV save like that. And of course ... completely unmentioned is the question of where that surgeon trained and practiced when he wasn't riding around in helicopters, and if future helicopter-surgeons (if they should exist at all!) should be twiddling their thumbs on active duty at Premier CONUS Army MTF or cranking out case after case as a reservist at Ordinary Civilian Hospital.

Funding isn't the problem.
I am certainly in favor of a reserve model for the vast majority of us and rolling the rest of our CONUS MTFs into the VA. We spend about 10% of the DODs budget on healthcare- even with the cost curve remaining relatively flat the last decade, it is still eating us alive, and that is why the line community wants a piece of that pie back from us.

The question is, how do you bring about radical changes to a system that seems content with just tinkering at the margins of the problem so far while continuing to tolerate the high costs, inefficiencies, and the never ending attrition of physicians?
 
The question is, how do you bring about radical changes to a system that seems content with just tinkering at the margins of the problem so far while continuing to tolerate the high costs, inefficiencies, and the never ending attrition of physicians?
You really can't, from within. Which is why we've been on a multi-decade slow-roll glide toward today's obviously predictable problems.

The way some businesses are crippled with the next-quarter stock price numbers to the point that they can't plan long term, the military is crippled with the in-two-years-I'll-be-in-a-different-billet-with-unrelated-issues-or-completely-gone leader problem.

For those people who stay and become senior leaders, most have to settle for being content with handwaving for bullet points to make O6. Virtually no one makes flag rank without being fundamentally conservative and status-quo. I can say it out loud now that I'm retired, but I had almost universally dim opinions of our medical corps admirals. I can think of exactly one admiral that I knew as an intern (he was an O5 then) and again as a resident (O6) and later when he made flag rank - and while I respect and admire him as both a smart/sincere guy who thoroughly "got it" the truth is that the military medical leadership, even at the flag rank, isn't really in charge because the line gets what the line wants. The strategic and force-level decisions aren't in their hands.

To a large degree, those decisions are in the hands of Congress and of course I don't need to go into how dysfunctional and self-serving those clowns are.

Also, the leaders we put in command of hospitals are grossly unqualified to be administrators of hospitals. Elephant in the room. I'm not saying that to be unkind or to suggest that they're bad people, or dumb, or not trying. They're just hilariously unqualified and helplessly unprepared and completely outmatched. It's insane that we think a couple years as an XO and some OJT are sufficient education, training, and experience to run a hospital system.


So - I don't think meaningful change can come from within. Which leaves external forces.

I have an outside sliver of hope that ACGME will start putting residency programs on probation as their quality declines, and that will spur some effective soul searching and real change as the new doc pipeline clogs up a little. (The 2006-era HPSP changes in response to recruitment woes showed us that rapid and effective action is possible if the billet-filling process is threatened.) But I think that's a long way off - on the whole the great majority of military residencies are still on solid accreditation ground when viewed in the context of all the other programs nationwide (many of which are truly inadequate).

Or Congress. This is my breath-holding face: :yeahright:
 
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Supplying a remote island like Taiwan after or during an attack will be impossible. So, we should be arming them to the teeth now.…

…I don't see a shooting war ever breaking out over Taiwan, either with or without us directly involved.

I agree that Taiwan’s ability to defend itself is important to “raise the price“ for China of military action. If we start aggressively arming Taiwan though, it is very reasonable to think that China blockades the East and South China Seas to prevent this. How do we know this? Because PLA doctrinal writing covers it extensively and they have even practiced it in exercises in recent years, including following Speaker Pelosi’s visit last year. It has long been speculated that a blockade is China’s preferred strategy for reunification.

It is easy to say that “well, the Chinese might blockade Taiwan a la the Cuban Missile Crisis but they will still allow the chips and domestic goods and everything else to keep flowing...they don’t want to devastate their own economy in the process”. I agree; I think economic impacts are the number one thing deterring the Chinese from attempting reunification and a blockade would be seen as an act of war under international law. Maybe this is all a bluff by the Chinese, but if not and they decide to forcibly reunify, do we think the US will stop its freedom of navigation operations while this is going on or not respond with a counter blockade of Chinese shipments through the Malacca Straights, particularly if there is economic fallout for us from the blockade? Both of these are plausible responses that are being discussed and wargamed right now, and they both have the potential to escalate.

I’m not trying to be alarmist, but I think it’s pretty unwise for us to downplay the risk of us being dragged into a conflict. Whether it will happen and whether it could happen are very different things. It is a real possibility and thus something we should all be considering, particularly for those of us still in uniform.
 
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I agree that Taiwan’s ability to defend itself is important to “raise the price“ for China of military action. If we start aggressively arming Taiwan though, it is very reasonable to think that China blockades the East and South China Seas to prevent this. How do we know this? Because PLA doctrinal writing covers it extensively and they have even practiced it in exercises in recent years, including following Speaker Pelosi’s visit last year. It has long been speculated that a blockade is China’s preferred strategy for reunification.

It is easy to say that “well, the Chinese might blockade Taiwan a la the Cuban Missile Crisis but they will still allow the chips and domestic goods and everything else to keep flowing...they don’t want to devastate their own economy in the process”. I agree; I think economic impacts are the number one thing deterring the Chinese from attempting reunification and a blockade would be seen as an act of war under international law. Maybe this is all a bluff by the Chinese, but if not and they decide to forcibly reunify, do we think the US will stop its freedom of navigation operations while this is going on or not respond with a counter blockade of Chinese shipments through the Malacca Straights, particularly if there is economic fallout for us from the blockade? Both of these are plausible responses that are being discussed and wargamed right now, and they both have the potential to escalate.

I’m not trying to be alarmist, but I think it’s pretty unwise for us to downplay the risk of us being dragged into a conflict. Whether it will happen and whether it could happen are very different things. It is a real possibility and thus something we should all be considering, particularly for those of us still in uniform.
Want to echo the sentiment of the last paragraph, more eloquent and nicer than what I would have conjured. Some comments above, we can look back in a couple years and laugh or note they didn’t age very well…. Not a military strategist just armchair daydreaming.
 
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Now it is about who “owns” the medical billets. The services fought to control their medical assets and still don’t know what to do with them. Owning them and being able to drag them along on every silly train up doesn’t make them well trained physicians. The line must be educated on what it takes to train a physician so that the line can take an active roll to keep their docs ready to deploy. That means the line should be asking the MTF for space for their surgeons to operate, their corpsman to train, etc. If DHA has filled the MTF’s with contractors then the line should be pushing their physicians to the best civilian partnerships in the area.

Get a standardized system in place for these partnerships and then educate the line on how to properly keep their physicians ready to go.

O6 physicians shouldn’t run hospitals. They should be coordinating the region/market’s ability to keep the active duty physicians busy in their specialty through either MTF care or civilian work by bridging the gap between line and service corps…military and civilian. Let civilian contractors administrate and run hospitals, let us as active duty physicians focus on how to keep our hands dirty on real live patients.
 
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or civilian work . .

Isn't that illegal? If you're drawing a gov't paycheck (funded by Joe Q. Taxpayer), and you go to work for a civilian entity ('civilian partnership', whatever), when said civilian entity is not reimbursing the gov't for your services, isn't that waste-fraud-abuse of gov't assets?
 
Now it is about who “owns” the medical billets. The services fought to control their medical assets and still don’t know what to do with them. Owning them and being able to drag them along on every silly train up doesn’t make them well trained physicians. The line must be educated on what it takes to train a physician so that the line can take an active roll to keep their docs ready to deploy. That means the line should be asking the MTF for space for their surgeons to operate, their corpsman to train, etc. If DHA has filled the MTF’s with contractors then the line should be pushing their physicians to the best civilian partnerships in the area.

Get a standardized system in place for these partnerships and then educate the line on how to properly keep their physicians ready to go.

O6 physicians shouldn’t run hospitals. They should be coordinating the region/market’s ability to keep the active duty physicians busy in their specialty through either MTF care or civilian work by bridging the gap between line and service corps…military and civilian. Let civilian contractors administrate and run hospitals, let us as active duty physicians focus on how to keep our hands dirty on real live patients.
Could not agree with you more. If we ran civilian hospitals like we ran MTFs they would be shuttering all over the country. This idea of replacing your MTF’s CO and board of directors every 3-4 years works about as well as it does for government agencies run by political appointees- great for maintaining a status quo or for changes that tinker at the margins, not great for long term process improvement initiatives or big changes.

And you’re right, line commanders need to be taught to think in terms of operational readiness of their medical officers- I don’t know how much of a concerted effort there has been to do this at higher headquarters across the services now since I’ve been removed from it for awhile, but I get the feeling we’re still not speaking in a language they (the line) understand. If you want that FST or STP/FRSS deploying with you, those docs need to be full up round, just like your infantry battalion or your wing. For docs, that means case volume and complexity of real patients, not simulations in the field and then rotting away in garrison somewhere the rest of the time. Green side MOs for instance-I think they should have their own mission essential task lists that include requirements for patient care either at MTFs or through civilian partnerships- maybe they do now- I’ve been away from that community for a few years- but I don’t think so.

Ultimately, DOD could make a number of these individual changes to improve physician training, GME, retention, etc. that we’ve all talked about for years or we could just roll the MHS into the VA and make us all reservists as has been previously suggested. I’d rather a radical change we have to adjust to then us limp along like this forever.
 
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Isn't that illegal? If you're drawing a gov't paycheck (funded by Joe Q. Taxpayer), and you go to work for a civilian entity ('civilian partnership', whatever), when said civilian entity is not reimbursing the gov't for your services, isn't that waste-fraud-abuse of gov't assets?
There are many different options for these partnerships. Some are set up as non-reimbursed. Others I have seen are a permanent moonlighting gig for a group (i.e. all urologists take rotating call at X location) and are paid accordingly. Just depends on the MOU. But if it is appropriately set up with an MOU, etc. and everyone is abiding by the agreed upon terms then no issues.
 
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I doubt we will all be reservists. Nor should we all be. This isn’t a one size fits all model. For instance, in Ortho sports we have high volume and a nice mix of complex cases in AD patients. Contrast that to neurosurgeons who rarely, if ever, get intracranial trauma at a non-trauma center MTF.

Identify where we are deficient in volume/complexity and figure out ways to supplement. The key is getting the line to understand how their med assets need to be working while in garrison.
 
I doubt we will all be reservists. Nor should we all be. This isn’t a one size fits all model. For instance, in Ortho sports we have high volume and a nice mix of complex cases in AD patients. Contrast that to neurosurgeons who rarely, if ever, get intracranial trauma at a non-trauma center MTF.

Identify where we are deficient in volume/complexity and figure out ways to supplement. The key is getting the line to understand how their med assets need to be working while in garrison.
The problem is that you can't run a tertiary MTF without sufficient volume in ALL specialties.

We saw them kick around the idea of getting rid of those uselessly non-war-critical OBs despite their good volume and case complexity ... with scarcely a thought to what closing the NICU and losing the pediatric pipeline would do to volume in pediatrics, surgery, anesthesia, radiology; as well as the impacts on experience for nurses and techs (surgical, rads, etc). And let's not forget volume for ancillary services like pharmacy, nutrition, etc. And what all that would mean for GME for those medical specialties, and non-categorical internships which feed the war-critical buckets.

None of us could believe (literally: none of us) how shockingly foolish and boneheaded that plan was, and yes, eventually cooler heads prevailed and OB wasn't cut to the bone. Everybody but the people making the plans understood immediately that this was the death knell for GME in multiple other specialties that were already barely making minimums and already supplementing weaknesses in core case loads with ever-increasing time at out rotations.

While it's great that ortho sports has sufficient cases and volume, it doesn't matter if the rest of the building is on fire.

Maybe you could get away with an ortho sports clinic in Norfolk and one in San Diego, but the Portsmouth and Balboa MTFs can't live on active duty patients with musculoskeletal issues.
 
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The problem is that you can't run a tertiary MTF without sufficient volume in ALL specialties.

We saw them kick around the idea of getting rid of those uselessly non-war-critical OBs despite their good volume and case complexity ... with scarcely a thought to what closing the NICU and losing the pediatric pipeline would do to volume in pediatrics, surgery, anesthesia, radiology; as well as the impacts on experience for nurses and techs (surgical, rads, etc). And let's not forget volume for ancillary services like pharmacy, nutrition, etc. And what all that would mean for GME for those medical specialties, and non-categorical internships which feed the war-critical buckets.

None of us could believe (literally: none of us) how shockingly foolish and boneheaded that plan was, and yes, eventually cooler heads prevailed and OB wasn't cut to the bone. Everybody but the people making the plans understood immediately that this was the death knell for GME in multiple other specialties that were already barely making minimums and already supplementing weaknesses in core case loads with ever-increasing time at out rotations.

While it's great that ortho sports has sufficient cases and volume, it doesn't matter if the rest of the building is on fire.

Maybe you could get away with an ortho sports clinic in Norfolk and one in San Diego, but the Portsmouth and Balboa MTFs can't live on active duty patients with musculoskeletal issues.
My point was you fully run the big hospitals with GME programs. Full GME programs. That still won’t train everyone. If you are staffed with 5 sub specialists in a certain field but only have volume for 3 then there are always two on rotation out somewhere. Also, people shouldn’t sit at Pendleton or 29 palms with nothing to do.

Everything is consolidated in to the large hospitals with GME programs. If you aren’t stationed at these large hospitals then you are covering what is left of the active duty outpatient clinics and surgery centers while also rotating out in to the community if volume/complexity isn’t enough.
 
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