I already said that I agree that the relative danger of the patient’s wishes being followed is a consideration. But in terms of the broader point, it may be the case that refusal to demonstrate is actually different than inability to demonstrate, but it is not functionally different. If someone takes the practical portion of their driver’s license test, it may be the case that someone unable to drive appropriately and someone being unwilling to drive appropriately are different situations, but they’re not functionally different for the purposes of the DMV approving licenses. That is my point here. I’m not saying that someone refusing to demonstrate is actually in the same position as someone unable to, but absent them somehow demonstrating it to someone else there is no way to tell.
You’re acting as if the “patient’s rights” only swings in favor of respecting their choice. It does not. This issue is actually an issue of competing patients’ rights. There is the right of an incapacitated patient to be protected from the negative consequences of their incapacity, and there is the right of competent patients to make their own medical decisions.
That might be what you do, but it is bad medicine. As I said, patients have multiple different rights. One of those is to be protected from the harm caused by making decisions they lack capacity to make.
If you’re saying that we’re in a situation where we “don’t know” if a patient is incapacitated, logically you must acknowledge that we are possibly dealing with an incapacitated patient. Would you not also agree that incapacitated patients have a right to be protected from making harmful decisions they don’t have capacity to make? Exactly what I would do would depend on what the treatment team told me about the patient’s prognosis under the various options, but I do think it could be very appropriate to cut off a leg in such circumstances. Say the surgeon tells me that by waiting, the patient has a significant risk of becoming septic, at which point their survival odds are much worse than if they had the procedure now. In such a circumstance, waiting does not do enough to protect the possibly incompetent patient from harm caused by allowing them to make a decision they lack capacity to make. By waiting, you are actually harming the patient because the chance of recovery and magnitude of that recovery is lessened. The chances that a person with capacity is going to refuse to talk up until the point that they’re putting them under to chop their leg off is minimal, in part because that itself would be a highly irrational behavior.
You’re misconstruing my statement as if it was not a specific illustration of the competition between beneficence/nonmaleficence and autonomy. You’re right that it is not strictly a principle itself, but it illustrates the heuristic we use to approach these conflicts.
Also, on what planet is autonomy a “primary principle?” There is no primary principle. There are many, at times competing, principles. Capacity evaluation involves all of the principles equally. It’s not fundamentally about respecting autonomy more than it is about any other principle.
My argument is that if someone refuses to talk to anyone about their decision and the decision is one of great importance, they should be treated as if they are incompetent. I don’t really care what your opinion is about that. This is actually how you’re supposed to treat patients.
Again, I’ll cite an article written by a bioethicist:
“When clinicians have done their best to obtain their patient's trust and engage in a dialogue with the patient, and when they have tried unsuccessfully to find others with whom the patient would agree to talk, they should assess the risk to the patient if the patient's wishes are followed. If the risk is significant, they should choose a course of action as if the patient were incompetent. They should also explain this to the patient as if the patient were competent.”
When patients refuse beneficial treatment, the assessment of decision-making capacity plays a key role in determining the best course of action. However, situations in which patients refuse to explain their reasons occur. This can make an assessment of capacity impossible. In such cases...
jamanetwork.com
Do you have a similarly reputable source for why you think this is wrong. If not, why are we pretending this is a matter of actual dispute rather than a personal crusade you have because you see autonomy as fundamentally more important than any other principle?
Again, there is no “primary principle.” On what arbitrary basis are you concluding that one principle should govern our behavior in one setting while another governs our behavior in another setting?
In the situation of someone who will not talk to anyone about their decision, the principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence are in conflict with that of autonomy. Here you have a person who possibly has capacity and possibly lacks capacity. In this situation, nonmaleficence and beneficence favor the course of action that will do the patient good and reduce their risk of adverse outcomes. Autonomy favors letting them make the decision. Do you really think that something magical happens when a person’s BP tanks and we no longer care as much about their autonomy? That is ridiculous. We give equal consideration to all of these principles in both situations. The person who will not discuss their decisions with anyone has the same right to be protected against harm from being allowed to make a decision they might not have capacity to make whether those consequences are gradual deterioration of their chance of recovery or immediate loss of function.
Again, “primary ethical principle” is not a thing. They are all equally considered at all times. Nothing about an emergency elevates a person’s right to be protected from bad medical decisions they don’t understand, nor does it diminish their right to make decisions about their care that they do understand. There is no “shift in primary ethical principle.” That is arbitrary nonsense. The only difference in an emergency situation is who makes the decision for someone who lacks capacity (or possibly lacks capacity). In most general circumstances, that is a surrogate decision maker. In emergencies, it may be the physician.
As I said above, if the alternative treatment exposes the patient to a significantly worse outcome than they would have had if the recommended intervention had been expeditiously provided, I do think it would be reasonable to cut off the leg. This is doing the alternative treatment does not actually protect the possibly incapacitated person from harm resulting from a decision they don’t understand.